

LEASING THE IVORY TOWER AT A SOCIAL JUSTICE UNIVERSITY

Freeport McMoRan, Loyola University New Orleans, and Corporate Greenwashing

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This article is a case study of the financial ties between Freeport-McMoRan Corporation and Loyola University, New Orleans. Freeport is a large transnational corporation that has a deplorable domestic and international environmental and human rights record in West Papua. Loyola University is a so-called social justice university that is advertised as an independent university that fosters critical thinking. The following analysis centers on Freeport's endowment of the environmental communication chair at Loyola and how Freeport constrained the internal operations of the university when faculty members and students protested the investment. It is argued that Freeport's investment in a social justice university provides a public relations function of greenwashing and human rights sterilization.

The following analysis is a case study of the financial ties and greenwashing connections between Freeport-McMoRan and Loyola University New Orleans. Two major questions are addressed: (a) how corporate funding may impose structural constraints on the internal operation of a university and (b) how universities may provide public relations services for corporations. Corporate philanthropy in a university setting serves two major functions for corporations: the socialization of costs for research and development, and public relations services for corporations. Because Loyola University is a so-called social justice institution, the financial investment provides an exceptional return as social justice experts greenwash the domestic and international environmental record of Freeport-McMoRan and sterilize the human rights abuses of the Suharto regime when Freeport's human rights or environmental record are subject to public criticism. This can be seen in particular in Freeport's endowment of the environmental communication chair at this social justice university. This article argues that academic freedom is fundamentally undermined when corporations control the purse strings.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Freeport's investment in Loyola University is a classic example of Lawrence Soley's (1995) *Leasing the Ivory Tower: The Corporate Takeover of Academia*. Since 1980, corporate investment in universities has increased from \$235 million to \$1.2 billion (Soley, 1995, p. 11). As universities are facing fiscal crises, they are relying on corporate investment as a source for funding. Soley (1997) concludes, "Now corporations and their foundations exert the same depth of influence on academia in the 1980s and the 1990s that the federal government did in the 1950s

and 1960s" (p. 24). This corporate investment has shifted the balance of power on campuses. In the past, universities have been the site of contestation and struggle, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. As Minsky (1995) points out,

A generation of environmental struggles had landed a significant commitment of financial resources for environmental studies programs at universities. Environmentalists supported by university positions revised science curricula to reflect environmental concerns, acted as expert witnesses against polluting companies, and won significant settlements in whistleblower-inspired lawsuits. These and other liberal campaigns were perceived as an obstacle to renewed corporate control. (p. ii)

The increased corporate investment is a means by which corporations may reclaim this power. As Herman and Chomsky (1988) point out, "Judge Powell, later elevated to the Supreme Court, wrote in a business memo to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he urged business to buy the top academic reputations in the country to add credibility to corporate studies and give business a stronger voice on campus" (pp. 23).

In addition, the increased corporate investment in universities functions to socialize the cost of business. O'Connor (1974) has pointed out that when universities conduct the research and development for corporations, the costs are socialized. In this sense, Freeport's funding of an environmental communication chair at Loyola will save the public relations costs that would be incurred by hiring a private public relations firm. Freeport points out that the chair "will service the needs of private industry" (Martinez, 1995). The chair is part of Freeport's broader goal to develop an environmental research consortium by funding all of Louisiana's major universities (Freeport-McMoRan advertisement, 1995; Freeport-McMoRan Resource Partners, 1995, p. 10). This consortium consists of the Freeport-McMoRan chair and Center for Environmental Modeling at the University of New Orleans, the Institute of Recyclable Materials at Louisiana State University, the Freeport-McMoRan bioenvironmental chair at Tulane University and the Xavier University Center for Bioenvironmental Research" (Freeport-McMoRan, 1995, p. 10).

The theoretical foundation for understanding Freeport's investment in Loyola University may also be derived from Domhoff's (1978) corporate power structure research and Glasberg's (1989) analysis of the power of the collective purse strings. Domhoff has demonstrated the power of corporations, as the economic basis of the monopoly capitalist class, to fund universities and foundations. The personal wealth of the capitalist class is derived from the ownership of the large corporation. As the most powerful economic institutions, corporations have disproportionate power over a number of strategic levels, such as research (e.g., universities and foundations), decision making (policy-planning groups), and opinion making (media and government commissions). Glasberg provides a structural analysis of how external funding may alter the internal operational control of an organization.¹ In this case, Freeport, a large transnational corporation, was able to exert pressure on the administration of the university by controlling external funding.

Freeport's investment in a social justice university provides an excellent financial return. As Useem (1984) points out, universities are frequently the beneficiaries of the corporate oblige noblesse. However, corporate philanthropy must be understood primarily in the context of the market. The bottom line is that universities conduct the research and development for corporations, and a corporate tie with a social justice university will provide an excellent return in the public relations

realm. The environmental communication chair may greenwash Freeport's domestic and international environmental record whereas the social justice experts may justify the exploitation of labor, the exclusion of surplus populations (the indigenous population, Amungme of West Papua), and use of the national security state (Suharto's brutal regime). Economic freedom is the justification for a positive political climate for investment.

As Herman (1995) has pointed out, the public relations functions for corporations have recently increased. As the "triumph of the market" has been achieved, the power of corporations extends to other noneconomic levels, including the ideological realm. Herman concludes that

information has been more and more privatized and commodified, its public good quality ignored, in the interest of serving the market. This strengthens the position of those able to control and pay for such information (i.e. the business sector, especially its larger units), and weakens the position of the general public. (p. 10)

The power of the corporations to constrain the ideological realm may also be understood in the context of Poulantzas's (1975) analysis of class struggle in contemporary capitalism. As Poulantzas points out, class struggle must be understood at three levels: economic, political and ideological (p. 15). As the monopoly segment of the capitalist class increases its economic and political power to create a power bloc, the ideological apparatuses serve the public relations functions for corporations. Given the relative power of corporations and the increased investment of corporations in universities, Soley (1995) concludes that

the ivory towers of America have been leased by corporations, wealthy patrons, and right-wing foundations. Being "politically correct" in academia today means having an endowed chair or a lucrative consulting contract. (pp. 14-15)

The hard won victories of environmentalists have been undermined as corporate power is reclaimed on university campuses. In this case, Freeport's investment in a social justice university provides an invaluable public relations function. When Freeport's domestic or international environmental record or human rights record is questioned, the social justice experts at Loyola University will set the record straight. Therefore, the environmental communication chair will, as Freeport points out, "service the needs of private industry" (Martinez, 1995). As corporations are concerned with the political climate of developing countries when making safe foreign investments, the political climate of universities must be friendly to the business interest. When the political climate is risky, the purse string is pulled.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY AND FREEPORT TIES

Loyola University New Orleans is a Jesuit institution that has historically been characterized as a social justice university. Faculty members are required to sign a statement affirming a commitment to Loyola's social justice goal. This goal explicitly states, "Education should be wisdom not technical competence" and education "must motivate us to a concern for our city, our state, our nation, our planet." Hence, "because of our human solidarity, a concern for one is a concern for all." Moreover, as the goal states, "Loyola is committed to a serious examination of those conscious and unconscious assumptions of contemporary American civilization that tend to perpetuate societal inequalities and institutional injustices." In

addition, the goal statement proposes that "education must be a catalyst for needed social change, hence dedicated to fostering a just social order." The goal statement emphasizes that because the university has an "independent status," the institution offers a "unique" and "critical" education (*Loyola University*, 1989). The administrators emphasize the social justice component of education and advertised the university as following the Jesuit tradition of "fostering critical thinking" (p. 11). Loyola developed many social justice organizations to achieve the social justice goal (e.g., the Loyola University Community Action Program [LUCAP], the Twomeny Center for Peace Through Justice and a number of journals, such as *Blueprint for Social Justice* and *Their Voices*). These organizations worked on such social justice issues as poverty, the rising gap between the rich and poor, and the rise of the National Security State in Third World countries. The university dedicated the Peace Quad to the six Jesuits murdered in El Salvador in 1989 by the U.S. trained Altacalt Brigade. In response to the increased interest of environmental degradation and the environmental justice movement, the university developed the environmental studies program.

Freeport-McMoRan is a corporation with a deplorable environmental record nationally and internationally. Freeport's mining operation in West Papua has received extensive criticism from human rights organizations. Freeport has historical ties with the Suharto regime in Indonesia. After Suharto's brutal rise to power in 1965, Freeport was one of the first corporations to make investments in West Papua.

Freeport is a major corporate investor in Loyola University. Freeport donated \$250,000 to support the Loyola Rec Plex and \$25,000 to support the conflict resolution program at the Twomeny Center for Peace and Justice, a program to resolve inner-city youth violence. The Joseph A. Butt, S. J., College of Business Administration has a cooperative venture with P. T. Freeport Indonesia that sends business professors to Tembagapura, Indonesia, for a technical training program. In 1992, Freeport gave the university a \$600,000 grant to fund a chair of environmental communication. Freeport's investment in Loyola University is \$1.15 million (Judice & Thompkins, 1995).

In January 1995, the Loyola Law School's Judge Robert Ainsworth Memorial Lecture was given by Henry Kissinger, a member of Freeport's Board of Directors. Not only is Kissinger on the board at Freeport, the corporation has paid Kissinger \$1 million in consulting fees for advice on the Indonesian operation (Cockburn & Silverstein, 1996, p. 182). If any figure in history deserved the brutality award in the quest for global dominance, it is Kissinger. Pick up any book on U.S. imperialism or even read the mainstream *New York Times* journalist Anthony Lewis and one will find that Kissinger supported some of the most brutally oppressive regimes (Chomsky, 1993; Hersch, 1983).

During the lecture by Henry Kissinger, former Judge Andrian Duplantier introduced Freeport-McMoRan's chief executive officer (CEO), Jim Bob, by saying, "Jim Bob never attended a Jesuit school and I'm fairly certain his corporation didn't either, but both Jim Bob and Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., exemplify the Ignatian principle of service to others" (Gaffney, 1995).

That is not entirely the characterization of Freeport and Jim Bob given by TAPOL, Rainforest Action Network, the East Timor Network, the student protesters at the University of Texas, the community activists battling the corporation in Austin, Texas, or the Amungme people of West Papua. Herman (1996) listed Jim Bob Moffett as one of the "dirty twenty war criminals" (p. 9). Press (1995a), in a recent *Nation* article, concluded that

Freeport is the picture of a modern corporation, heedless of a country or flag, ruthless in the pursuit of profit. . . . Across the globe its trail is marked by despoiled lands, poisoned water, ruined lives—its progress assured by a powerful nexus of forces, in Irian Jaya, it is the Indonesian military that guarantees Freeport's ability to do what it wants. In America, all the regulations on the books don't threaten its standing as the nation's number one polluter. (p. 125)

FREEPORT-MCMORAN

Freeport-McMoRan moved its headquarters to New Orleans in 1986. Initially, there was public protest over Freeport's environmental policies. The primary concern was Freeport's dumping of radioactive phosphosypsum and phosphoric acid heavy metals into the Mississippi River, the water supply source of New Orleans area. Freeport has investments in agricultural minerals and in the exploration of copper and gold. Freeport-McMoRan Resource Partners (FRP) is one of the "world's leading integrated phosphate fertilizer producers" used to grow grains, especially corn (Freeport-McMoRan Resource Partners, 1995, p. 1). Freeport is the largest producer of sulphur in the world. Freeport mines oil from the same geological formation as the sulphur deposit. Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold (FCX) is one of the world's largest copper and gold producers. FCX's operations are conducted through its majority-owned subsidiaries, P. T. Freeport Indonesia (PT-FI) operations Irian Jaya, Indonesia, involve mineral exploration and development (Freeport-McMoRan Gold and Copper, 1996).

The CEO of the corporation is James R. Moffett ("Jim Bob"). Jim Bob owns one of the historic mansions on St. Charles Street. Moffett is one of the highest paid CEOs on the Forbes "Corporate America's Most Powerful People" list. Among the 800 top American executives, Moffett ranks 313 and in the metals industry he ranks eighth with a salary of \$1.8 million and \$1.9 million in stocks (Hardy, 1996, p. 226). Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold in 1995 ranked 276 in the Forbes 500 (net profits) list with \$1.8 billion in sales and \$253 million in net profits (Forbes, 1996, p. 310).

FREEPORT'S DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

Domestically, Freeport's environmental policies are deplorable. Freeport battled the city of Austin, Texas, over a 4,000-acre real estate development plan that would dump sewage into Barton Springs. When a 1992 citywide referendum attempted to stop the development, Freeport threatened to "bankrupt the city with lawsuits" and hired 10 lobbyists to pressure the Texas legislature to undermine Austin's water quality standards (Press, 1995a). In 1993, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that Freeport was the number one corporate polluter, releasing 193.6 million pounds of toxic material into the air, water, and soil (Press, 1995a). The EPA 1995 report cites "Freeport as the number one polluter of land, air, and water in North America" (cited in Press, 1995a, p. 125). Freeport is a major contributor to the notorious New Orleans Cancer Corridor. The company dumps radioactive phosphosypsum and phosphoric acid heavy metals into the Mississippi River. In 1984, Freeport received an exemption from the Clean Water Act to dump toxic waste into the river. The U.S. Public Interest Research Group reported that the Freeport Agrico Chemical Company discharged 83.6 million pounds of toxic waste into Louisiana waters in 1992. Currently, Freeport is part of

the effort to gut environmental regulations. Freeport is a member of the Clean Water Industry Coalition, which is attempting to eliminate pollution regulations. As a member of the Fertilizer Institute, Freeport is pressuring the EPA to remove phosphoric acid from its list of toxic substances (Press, 1995a).

FREEPORT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia was colonized in the 19th and early 20th century (Scheiner, 1996, p. 3). The Japanese occupied Dutch Indonesia and Portuguese Timor during World War II. The United States encouraged the Netherlands to leave the Indonesian colony so that international trade could be established in the area (TAPOL, 1984). The United States negotiated the New York Agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The West Papuans were not included in the agreement. Indonesia gained independence and annexed West Papua in 1963 (Scheiner, 1996, p. 4).

West Papua is rich in many natural resources, especially timber, gold, and copper. The indigenous people of West Papua, the Amungme, experienced the classic relationship of imperialism as the tribe was forced to sell rainforest lands. The rainforest's vast timber resources, which are second only to Brazil, were sold for \$2 a tree, even though the market value of the timber was worth 250 times that amount (Baker, 1994). The Suharto regime used the Indonesian Agrarian Law, which states that "land and water and natural riches shall be controlled by the state as the highest authority" (*IWGIA*, 1992, p. 15). Suharto and the transnational corporations promised employment for the exchange of land; however, in 1980 an epidemic "swept through the resettlement camp killing 216 children, which was more than 20 percent of the Amungme population" (*IWGIA*, 1992, p. 16; TAPOL, 1984). In the 1967 contract between Freeport and the Jakarta government, Freeport hired villagers for 10 cents an hour to build roads for Freeport and then, when the mining facility was in full production, the villagers were "transferred to resettlement camps along the coastal lowlands where many died of malaria" (Press, 1995a, p. 130). Since 1967, when Freeport was granted the rights to exploit West Papua's mineral resources, the indigenous population, the Amungme, have been forced to relocate. The indigenous populations of West Papua represent an excluded population in the same fashion Native Americans represented the surplus population in the westward expansion. Charles Scheiner (1996), the national coordinator of the East Timor Action Network, describes this pattern as "manifest destiny Asian style" as the indigenous peoples living around the mine were forcefully relocated.² Ironically, Freeport's investment in West Papua has been described as a miracle achievement because Moffett boasted of Freeport's benefit to the area by pointing out, "We are thrusting a spearhead of development into the heartland of Irian Jaya" (*IWGIA*, 1992, p. 13).

The major natural resources of West Papua are gold and copper. The gold and copper reserves are worth more than \$60 billion (Press, 1996; Scheiner, 1996). In 1967, Freeport was granted the rights to exploit West Papua's mineral resources. Freeport was permitted to explore a 2.61 million hectare area stretching through the Baliem Valley to the Papua New Guinea border ("Freeport's Extension," 1992). In exchange, President Suharto gained 10% ownership of the Freeport-McMoRan Grasberg mine (Press, 1995a). When Freeport started mining in 1972, Indonesia had no environmental protection regulations. Environmental groups have pointed out that "Freeport's remote location has shielded it from government and NGO monitoring" ("The Polluted Ajikwa," 1990, p. 21).

The Glasberg mine contains the world's largest known gold deposit, an estimated 22 million ounces, 15 billion pounds of copper, and 37 million ounces of silver. In April 1994, Freeport increased output at the mine raising the income of Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold to \$332 million ("Gold Rush in New Guinea," 1995, p. 68). Freeport is now the single largest taxpayer in Indonesia. Freeport employs 14,000 Indonesians from the main island of Java and indirectly employs 40,000 workers through domestic procurement. In 1995 alone, the Indonesian government earned \$250 million in royalties, corporate taxes, and dividends. In a dedication ceremony, Suharto renamed the town Kuala Kencana (Golden Estuary) and "expressed support for [Freeport's] operations" (Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, 1995, p. 2).

When human rights activists pointed out Suharto's human rights abuses, Moffett, chair and CEO of Freeport, responded by saying, "We find President Suharto a compassionate man." Historical points on Suharto's compassion record include the following: President Suharto murdered more than 1 million people to gain control of Indonesia in 1965. The CIA, hardly given to overstating the human rights abuses of an American ally, called it "one of the ghastliest and most concentrated blood-lettings of current times" and compared it with the "Nazi mass murders during the Second War" (Chomsky, 1993, pp. 122-123; Udin, 1996, p. 20). In 1967, Suharto established himself as president and "launched the Orde Baru [New Order], setting up a fascist regime ruled by terror and torture that continues today" (Udin, 1996, p. 21). In 1975, with the assistance of Henry Kissinger, Suharto invaded East Timor. The Australian parliament described this event as "indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War II history." As Colonel Gatot Purwanto, the occupation intelligence chief, confirmed, "The Indonesian armed forces killed one-third [200,000] of East Timor's population" (Anderson, 1994; Naim, 1995; Pinto & Jardine, 1997, p. xv).

According to the State Department, U.S. companies supplied some 90% of the weapons by the Indonesian Armed Forces used during the invasion (Jardine, 1995, p. 36).² In 1979, the second phase of the invasion began. Indonesian pilots, armed with American counterinsurgency aircraft, began bombing Timorese villages and crops, destroying their food supply, "resulting in the mass starvation and famine" (Udin, 1996, p. 22). Freeport, along with other U.S.-based weapons contractors and multinationals, have lobbied for the Suharto regime and weapons sales (Udin, 1996, p. 23).

In 1967, when the West Papuans revolted and sabotaged the Freeport copper slurry pipeline, the Suharto military crushed the rebellion, burning homes, torturing and killing hundreds in so-called Operation Annihilation. Human rights activists list the number of dead in the thousands, whereas the Indonesian military admits to 900. Forced relocation continues with the most recent case in January 1994 when 2,000 Amungme living near the Freeport mine were forced by the Indonesian military to move (Press, 1995a). In April 1995, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid documented "the killing and disappearances of 15 members of the Free Papua Movement [organizes Papua Merdeka] and 22 civilians in Freeport controlled territories" (Press, 1995a; Scheiner, 1996, p. 6). The Australian council report *Trouble at Freeport* concluded that "Indonesian troops carried out abuses in Freeport facilities and Freeport security cooperated with the army during some incidents including a Christmas Day, 1994 attack that killed three people and disappeared five others" (Press, 1996, p. 33). Although Freeport denies any involvement in human rights abuses, Freeport admits that it "works closely with" the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) (Press, 1995a; Scheiner, 1996, p. 6).

Freeport provides equipment and transport for the ABRI, who, in turn, provides security for the corporation's mining operation. *Business Week* ("Gold Rush in New Guinea," 1995) reported that "Freeport called in the Indonesian Army" in 1994 and "at least 16 tribespeople" were killed (p. 66). The ABRI used "Freeport-provided containers as torture chambers" (Press, 1995a; Scheiner, 1996). Freeport has a contract with the Indonesian military personnel at the mine providing food, transportation, and shelter. Human rights reports (Indonesian National Human Rights Commission) have confirmed the Australian council's findings.

Freeport also has many financial ties with Suharto. Freeport's close ties to the Suharto family recently allowed the corporation to secure a partnership with a small Canadian exploration company, Bre-X minerals in the Indonesian part of Borneo. DePalma (1997) concluded that

the allure of so much gold . . . impelled the competing companies to use whatever means they could to close a deal. This included tapping the Indonesian Government's inclination to make deals based on personal alliances, and playing up to various members of the family of President Suharto. . . . In the end, success went to the company with the closest contacts with the President and his advisers, and the longest experience in playing by Indonesia's rules. (p. C1)

An instrumental person in the Bre-X deal was Mohamad (Bob) Hasan, a stockholder in Freeport and "an insider, trusted friend of, and golfing partner of President Suharto" (DePalma, 1997, p. C6). Hasan also manages the investments of Suharto's charitable foundation.

Freeport's connections to Suharto were also important in the \$1.8 billion deal between Freeport and the British mining corporation, RZT, in 1995. RZT acquired 18% of Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold for \$875 million and financed \$850 million for the exploration and production operations at Freeport's subsidiary, Freeport Indonesia and Eastern Mining (McBeth, 1995b).

Recently, Freeport increased its investment in the Grasberg mine. Freeport made a \$4.7 billion investment in the Grasberg mine, building a city in the jungle for 20,000 workers. The mine is an open pit mine that towers above the vast coastal rain forest of West Papua. Freeport dumps more than 110,000 tons of mining tailings into the river system every day (*Gold Rush in New Guinea*, 1995, p. 68). The Aghawagong-Otomona-Ajikwa river system constitutes the core of the Lorentz National Reserve, one of the most ecologically "sensitive areas of the world" (*IWGIA*, 1992, p. 13). The Indonesian Forum for Environment, a nongovernment agency partly funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), reported that the massive tailings "harm the Ajkwa River and lowland rainforest" (*Gold Rush in new Guinea*, 1995, p. 68). A recent report from a rainforest organization states that "residents along the Ajkwa River have been warned against drinking the water" that has been contaminated by the tailings, and Yusuf Tappand from the provincial administration's environmental promotion bureau said that "Freeport's mining waste also affected thousands of hectares of forest along the river" ("River Ajkwa Water Undrinkable," 1997).

A Jakarta-based environmental organization, WALHI, requested that Freeport follow the standard practice of other mining operations in the world and neutralize the tailing before dumping. In addition, WALHI requested that Freeport allow independent monitoring of the mining operation. Freeport responded to these requests by sending AID a letter demanding that AID terminate WALHI's funding

for "openly affiliating with radical nongovernmental organizations such as Earth First!, Friends of the Earth, Global Response and Greenpeace" (Press, 1996, p. 34).

In November 1995, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the federal agency that provides political risk insurance for U.S. companies operating internationally, terminated the \$100 million in federal risk insurance to Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold ("Freeport-McMoRan Hit," 1995).³ OPIC concluded that Freeport "breached its contract by sharply increasing the amount of ore processed" ("Gold Rush in New Guinea," 1995, p. 68; McBeth, 1995a, p. 100). The report concluded thus:

OPIC has determined that through its monitoring activities that Freeport's implementation of the project, and especially its tailing management and disposal practices, have severely degraded the rain forests surrounding the Ajkwa and Minejeri Rivers. . . . The project has created and continues to pose unreasonable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the surrounding terrestrial ecosystem, and the local inhabitants. (Yerton, 1995, p. 1)

OPIC is an agency that is extremely important for transnational corporations that make investments in developing countries. The insurance protects corporations against the "possibility that its assets overseas will be damaged or seized as a result of political upheavals" ("Freeport-McMoRan Hit," 1995, p. 1A). This was the first time that OPIC had terminated insurance to an American company for environmental or human rights reasons. After an "intensive lobby effort" by Freeport executives, Henry Kissinger, and President Suharto to pressure the Clinton administration, OPIC reinstated the insurance (Press, 1996, p. 34).

In March 1996, anti-Freeport rioters closed down the mine (Judice, 1996, p. F1). The Amugme, Komoro, Dani, and Moni of West Papua met with Moffett and explained why they were rioting. They said:

We fight against Jim Bob Moffett, Freeport and the government. We fight because our rights are not recognized, our resources are extracted and destroyed while our lives are taken. (Press, 1996, p. 32)

The indigenous peoples presented a number of resolutions against Freeport including the right to have democratic control over their resources and land and the dismantling of Freeport's security forces (Judice, 1996, p. F1; Press, 1996, p. 32). The Amungme live in the northern part of the Central Ranges of Irian Jaya, the locations of Freeport's gold and copper mines. The Kamoro peoples live downstream in the banks of Ajkwa and Muamiua Rivers. The Kamoro protest Freeport's toxic tailings that have "damaged the sago stands, hunting grounds and forest resources" (World News from Radio Australia, January 28, 1997). The indigenous peoples have rejected the one percent Trust Fund for community development that Freeport has set up. As *Business Week* ("Gold Rush in New Guinea," 1995) reported, "In the eyes of the Amungme, Freeport and the Indonesian government are getting rich off their ancestral lands in exchange for mere consolation prizes" (p. 68). In addition, community leaders pointed out that 96% of the money will be given to the military and government-sponsored programs (Mokhiber, 1997).

Recently, the indigenous peoples have attempted to bring a lawsuit against Freeport in the United States. The class action lawsuit (*Benal v. Freeport-McMoRan*),

filed April 29, 1996, seeks \$6 billion in damages from Freeport for environmental and human rights abuses that have been linked to Freeport's gold, copper, and silver mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia. The presiding magistrate, Judge Duval, found that Tom Benal's suit, for the indigenous peoples, "had a basis in law" charging Freeport with "tribal genocide and human rights abuses" ("Benal's Lawsuit," 1997, p. 1). Nevertheless, Judge Duval agreed that "as destructive as Freeport's corporate policies are to the natural habitat of Indonesia, there is no definitive international law which may be applied to a corporation" ("Benal's Lawsuit," 1997, p. 1).

FREEPORT'S ENVIRONMENTAL COMMUNICATION CHAIR

There is some disagreement regarding the origin of the Loyola environmental communication chair. Joseph Mansfield, Loyola's vice president for institutional advancement, in the historical review of the chair, indicated that "in 1992 Freeport provided \$600,000 in response to a proposal from us to endow a chair in environmental communications in our Department of Communications" (Mansfield, 1995, p. 10). However, Freeport's advertisements and the annual report from the corporation indicate the chair is part of Freeport's Environmental Research Consortium of Louisiana that includes the University of New Orleans, Louisiana State University, Tulane University, and Xavier University (Freeport-McMoRan, 1995).

Between October 1992 when the Freeport endowed chair was first proposed and August 1996 when the position was filled, the position was subject to controversy. The earliest criticisms came from John Clark, professor of philosophy and environmental studies. In 1993, Professor Clark received a complaint from the special assistant to President James Carter regarding a poster Clark had placed in his office window referring to Freeport's number one position in water pollution in North America (Clark, 1996). In response, Clark sent extensive material on Freeport's environmental record and the company's connection with the Suharto regime and questioned the endowed chair position. In April 1995, Assistant Law Professor William P. Quigley sponsored a resolution that the \$600,000 be returned to Freeport, citing "crimes against humanity in places like Indonesia as well as well as Freeport's lack of commitment to preserving the environment throughout the world" (Bonura, 1995a, p. 1). President Carter, S. J., rejected the resolution indicating "there wasn't enough reliable information to decline the money" (Bonura, 1995a, p. 5).

President Carter retired and Reverend Benard Knoth, S. J., became president in August 1995. Knoth received information regarding the Freeport-Loyola controversy. During Knoth's interviews with faculty members in March 1995, I met with Knoth and handed him a file of information regarding Freeport's record, and John Clark sent Knoth a letter before he arrived on campus in August 1995. Members of the Jesuit Identity Task Force attempted to sponsor a symposium about the ethical concerns of accepting money from Freeport-McMoRan; however, as the student newspaper headline reported, "Knoth delays forum to discuss tainted money" (Bonura, 1995b, p. 1). During Loyola Day, October 1995, a day "designed to reflect on the history and traditions of St. Ignatius Loyola" and following President Knoth's address on Jesuit education, faculty members raised ethical questions regarding Loyola's relationship with Freeport. Marcus Smith, associate professor of English, said, "There is evidence that Freeport epitomizes the culture of savage capitalism," and he chastised the university administration for delaying an open forum on the issue, concluding that an "examination of conscience must not be postponed" (Massa, 1995, p. 1).

In November 1995, LUCAP sponsored a forum entitled "Freeport-McMoRan and Social Justice" (Templet, 1995a, p. 3). Although President Knoth was invited to the forum, he refused to attend, stating that he "felt that the gift should not be a focus at this time" (Templet, 1995a, p. 3). In addition, Knoth recommended that Thomas Egan, senior vice president of Freeport, should reject the invitation to attend the forum because "the forum would represent the opinion of ideologues" (Bonura, 1995b, p. 1).

On November 9, 1995, after the OPIC canceled Freeport's insurance, a march was organized by Delta Greens and Earth First!. Faculty members, students, and members of the Loyola Community Action Program participated in the protest. Some were protesting "Loyola's financial connections with Freeport and called for the return of the \$600,000 Environmental Communications grant" (Falgoust, 1995a, p. 1). Protesters carried signs that read "Freeport-McMoRan giving something back and it's toxic" and chanting "Jim Bob kills for profit" (Falgoust, 1995a, p. 1). President Knoth said, "The demonstrators outside Moffett's house did not represent the university's position and were acting on unsubstantiated allegations" (Moffett, 1995, p. B8). Two days after the protest, Moffett said he wanted "the university to return the \$600,000 gift" (Williams, 1995, p. A1). The next day, Loyola's student government voted to keep the gift and voted 24 to 10 against a resolution that described Freeport as "one of the world's largest polluters" (Williams, 1995, p. A1). The chair of the environmental studies program at Loyola, Tony Ladd, sent a letter to President Knoth a week after the November 1995 protest indicating the "majority of the program's faculty members voted to have the search for the Environmental Communication be halted until there could be further discussion, study, and reflection at the school on the issues such as Freeport's environmental record in Indonesia, its U.S. lobbying activities and the standards for filling the endowed chair" (Moffett, 1995, p. B8). President Knoth supported Freeport and said he felt "the greater good of the university would be served, both now and in the future, by accepting the money" (Templet, 1995a, p. 3). The position was filled August 1996 (Massa, 1996).

FREEPORT CONSTRAINS LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

In March 1995, when I met with the new president Bernard Knoth during the presidential-faculty meeting, I handed him the material on Freeport's environmental record and the reports of human rights abuses in Irian Jaya. I asked him about the possible contradiction of the financial ties with Freeport and Loyola's social justice goal statement. I raised a question regarding the possible structural constraint that Freeport might impose on the university by controlling the purse strings. What if faculty members or students became critical of the corporation? I asked him what problems Freeport's investment may pose on academic freedom if I critically presented this material in one of my sociology courses at Loyola University?

The answer came several months after the November 1995 protest outside the home of Jim Bob Moffett. In response to the protest, as we have seen, Moffett "requested that Loyola give the money [\$600,000 endowed chair fund] back" (Judice & Thompkins, 1995). *The New York Times* (Norris, 1995) gave a sardonic Academic Freedom Award to Freeport-McMoRan for demanding that Loyola return the money after the student demonstration. James Gill (1995), a journalist for the local New Orleans newspaper, the *Times-Picayune*, concluded, "Moffett

asked for his money back to show his displeasure at Loyola University's failure to stifle dissent" (p. 1A).

In a press conference, the president of Loyola University, Reverend Bernard Knoth, S. J., said he "would neither comment or deny the allegations" that "disciplinary actions would be taken against faculty and staff involved in the rally" (Johnson, 1995, p. 2; Williams, 1995, p. A7). When questions were raised as to whether Alvar Alcazar, Loyola Community Action Program advisor, would "lose his job for his involvement," the assistant to the president responded, "on advice of legal council, Fr. Knoth has no comment" (Falgoust, 1995a, p. 3). Gill (1995) pointed out, "Knoth even refuses to rule out a trip to the wood shed for those who do not share his view that Freeport is innocent of any environmental offense" (p. 1A). William Bennett, associate professor of the Loyola business administration, said,

student and faculty participation in the march was unconscionable. . . . The holier than thou attitude creates a climate of hate. . . . Indonesia, as a developing nation has to create its own environmental standards and it is unrealistic to expect them to live up to the standards of developed nations. . . . It appears that a secession movement is brewing in Indonesia. . . . It's unfortunate, but when that happens people are killed. (cited in Bonura, 1995b, p. 3)

Some students called for the "immediate suspension of all those involved in the protest" and LUCAP received a death threat for its involvement of the protest (Stuart, 1995, p. 1, 3). The student newspaper, *Maroon*, conducted an opinion poll, asking if protesters should be reprimanded (Falgoust, 1995b, pp. 1, 4; "Opinion Poll," 1995, p. 3). The English department felt compelled to send a memo to President Knoth that the department "unanimously affirms the right of all students and faculty in the Loyola community to assemble and openly discuss" and "no student or faculty member should suffer any penalties or repercussions for exercising the right to assemble and speak" ("Knoth Silence," 1995, p. 3). In a report to members of all visiting committees, Mansfield (1995), vice president for Loyola's Institutional Advancement, emphasized that "legal counsel has also been consulted to assure that we are within our legal rights on all aspects of this issue" (p. 1). When a forum was sponsored by LUCAP, faculty members and students, and other Loyola professors attempted to openly discuss the environmental communication chair, President Knoth refused to participate and stifled dissent (Bonura, 1995b, p. 1). In an attempt to isolate the protesting students, President Knoth argued that it was necessary for Loyola to accept the \$600,000 chair or the students would need to pay higher tuition.

President Knoth, in support of Freeport polices, failed to mention a number of ethical issues raised with Freeport's financial ties with other universities. Freeport's \$1.4 million investment with the University of Texas geology department created a number of financial and ethical problems for the university. Moffett was involved in a major controversy at the University of Texas when university administration members planned to name a \$25 million molecular biology building after Moffett and his wife, Louise. Moffett donated \$2 million for the project and Freeport donated another \$1 million ("Faculty Discontinue," 1995). Environmental activists collected 3,150 signatures protesting the Moffett name, but University of Texas president Robert Berdahl purchased a full-page advertisement in the *Daily Texan* that indicated "reneging on the agreement to name the building for the Moffetts would compromise the fundamental principal of institutional neutrality that establishes the moral framework and the intellectual environment of the university"

("Faculty Discontinue," 1995). In addition, the intense controversy at the University of Texas at Austin and Freeport financial ties forced Chancellor William Cunningham to resign his \$40,000 a year board of director position at Freeport (Scribner, 1996).

FREEPORT'S PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN

It is clear that Freeport intends to buy environmental experts at many of the Louisiana campuses in the same fashion that Freeport placed a number of new media personnel on Freeport's payroll, including the New Orleans media critic Garland Robinette (former anchor of WWL), Gerard Braud (anchor of WDSU), and *Austin American-Statesman* reporter Bill Collier. Freeport's investment in many of Louisiana's universities already paid off in the public relations realm. Oliver Houck (1996), a professor at the Tulane Law School, pointed out after the publication of Press's (1995a) critical article in the *Nation*, that professors at UNO drafted a letter criticizing the article and defending Freeport's environmental and human rights record. Houck pointed out that at least the professors were honest enough to disclose that they were "under contract with Freeport." When the OPIC news broke, the local newspaper, the *Times-Picayune*, received letters from the chancellor of UNO, a recipient of a \$1.6 million grant, the president of Loyola University, Knoth (\$1.15 million investment), and the dean of the College of Business at UNO. Tulane University, a recipient of a \$1.2 million Freeport grant, paid for a full-page advertisement in the *Times-Picayune* applauding Freeport's environmental record (Houck, 1996).

After the OPIC canceled Freeport's insurance, WLAE, the New Orleans public television station, broadcasted what General Manager Jim Kelly called an educational special on Freeport. The 28-minute infomercial was produced by Planit Communications, a public relations firm "spun off by Freeport in 1993" (Lorando & Yerton, 1995, C1). The program allowed Freeport to "state its position fully, without interruption, challenge from critics or editing by news producers and reporters," as president of Planit Communications, Garland Robinette, pointed out (Lorando & Yerton, 1995, p. C1). WLAE offered to run the infomercial free. Kelly pointed out the infomercial was "very well done . . . very educational about things like mining" and "I thought it would be interesting to the New Orleans community to hear Freeport's explanation about what it's doing in Indonesia" (Lorando & Yerton, 1995, p. C3).

Leasing the ivory tower is the educational extension of the media's attempt to greenwash Freeport's environmental policies and sterilize its human right abuses. Freeport has launched many extensive public relations campaigns by hiring one of the world's largest public relation's firms, Ogilve and Mather, following many extensive critical reports of Freeport's environmental and human rights record ("The Grass Isn't Greener," 1992, p. 2).

What exactly might an environmental communication chair amount to? Well, if Freeport's media control and infomercials are any indicators of Freeport's direction of media information, then the endowed chair in a university might be expected to produce similar educational infomercials. A few salient points demonstrate Freeport's response to media critics. Besides putting media critics on the payroll, Freeport pleaded with the *National Geographic* not to print a photo of its radioactive gypsum stack in Louisiana (Press, 1995a). In response to the 1994 *National Geographic* article on pollution of the Lower Mississippi, a local "educational society" published a letter in the *Times-Picayune* defending Freeport. The educa-

tional society, by the way, was funded by Freeport. Freeport criticized many reporters for not "visiting and researching their stories on the scene." However, Houck (1996) pointed out, "Nobody visits Freeport's operations in Indonesia without, at the very least, Freeport's permission." In fact, Bill Elder, a news anchor for New Orleans Channel 4 was denied entry into Irian Jaya to film a report on the Indonesian government. He was told that "his entry was contingent on his agreement to be accompanied by Freeport escorts and to use only Freeport cameras and equipment" (Houck, 1996). Critics of Freeport have also been threatened with lawsuits. Spokespersons for Freeport, such as Thomas J. Egan (1995), have referred to Press's (1995a) *Nation* article as a "malicious hit piece," also alleging that Robert Bryce, a *New York Times* journalist who wrote a story on the OPIC cancellation of Freeport's political risk insurance, is "a biased reporter on a crusade against the company" (Egan, 1995, p. 9). Egan criticized the *Maroon* for relying on information from such a "discredited" and "fringe publication" as the *Nation* (p. 9). Of course, Egan cites *The Wall Street Journal*, the U.S. business newspaper, as evidence that the *Nation* is biased.

In a recent *Forbes* (1996) article, Jim Bob Moffett was depicted as the powerless victim of "environmental imperialism" and the target of environmental control freaks at Loyola University (p. 136). To emphasize the idea of corporate victimization, the business journal found Richard Sanford, Ph.D., "a respected geologist who heads up the Society for Objective Science" (p. 132). When asked about sustainable development, Dr. Sanford responded, "sustainable development is fundamentally fascist and is a smoke screen for socialism" (McMenamin, 1996, p. 132).

As Press (1995a) points out, when the Amungme, who live around the Freeport mining area, begged a Freeport executive "to cover us and our belongings" because Freeport destroyed their means of subsistence—land and water—the public relations experts were able to sterilize the account into this translation: "Freeport is bringing Irian Jaya from the Stone Age to the 20th Century," and "children in a classroom Freeport built in a village of Banti are enjoying the fruits of capitalism," and Irian Jaya "has more pressing human needs than preserving pristine wilderness" (McMenamin, 1996, p. 128). *Forbes* (1996) depicted Jim Bob Moffett as a powerless victim of the powerful student and faculty protesters at Loyola. In the spirit of noblesse oblige, Freeport was depicted as a socially responsible actor that had developed the backward Irian Jaya. *Forbes* perverted the nature and logic of imperialism by arguing that environmentalists are the real imperialists. This is similar to Omi's (1991) thesis of how the Right rearticulates the ideology of the civil rights movement. In this case, the powerful (corporations and the CEOs) are depicted as the powerless, whereas human rights activists and environmentalists are depicted as the agents of imperialism—not transnational corporations, the internal capitalists (the Suharto family), and the repressive arm of the National Security State (the Indonesian Military).

Loyola's characterization of Freeport, Moffett, and Kissinger as social justice actors serves to obscure the brutality of imperialism. The environmental communication department will be able to produce favorable environmental accounting of Freeport's domestic and environmental record.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IS UNDERMINED

The Loyola faculty and student protesters were isolated and threatened with academic and legal reprisals after the November 1995 protest at Moffett's home. LUCAP was pressured not to organize any more protests of Freeport's investment

in the university (Falgoust, 1996). A year after the initial protest, Earth First! organized another demonstration in front of Moffett's home. Only a few Loyola students and faculty members participated in this demonstration. As Anthony Ladd, sociology professor at Loyola, pointed out, "Apparently the intimidation has worked because very few students continue to be involved in the issue" (Falgoust, 1996, p. 4). Another Loyola faculty member, John Clark (1996), pointed out "social and ecological justice activists have received death threats, bomb threats, slashed tires, and possible loss of employment" for the protest against Freeport (p. B7). In addition, Clark (1996) writes, Freeport has sent "many activists letters hinting at legal action and directed more intimidating letters to eight critics including the Freeport Watch Bulletin" (p. B7).

Despite the protest, the environmental communication chair was filled August 1996 by Robert A. Thomas (Massa, 1996, p. 1). A review of his resume indicates that Thomas is a member of the Environmental Research Consortium of Louisiana, a research consortium that Freeport developed. Moreover, he was the vice president for environmental policy at the Audubon Institute, an extension of Freeport McMoRan Audubon Species Survival Center (Freeport McMoRan, 1995, p. 1). In addition, Thomas is a member of the National Wetlands Coalition (NWC). The NWC was established in 1989 by "utilities companies, miners, and real estate developers hired by the Washington law firm of Van Ness, Feldman and Curtis to open wetlands to commercial development" (Deal, 1993, p. 70). As Deal points out, the NWC is part of the business coalition to "gut environmental laws and steamroll regulatory reform" (p. 46). The NWC was instrumental in drafting the Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act (1995), which proposes to "restrict the definition of wetlands even further, and to have taxpayers compensate property owners for legal fees and financial losses when environmental restrictions are applied." The Environmental Working Group (1996) reported that the political action committees associated with the National Wetlands Coalition gave more than \$2.6 million to members of the House that voted against the Gilchrest amendment, a water pollution control amendment. The Freeport PAC, the Freeport-McMoRan Citizenship Committee gave \$49,000 to House members who voted against the amendment (Environmental Working Group, 1996, p. 2). Thomas also has a number of business ties including the Rotary Club and the Chamber of Commerce.⁵

A review of Thomas's publications indicated that of his 46 environmental publications, 13 are in *EnviroInfoSheet*, 11 are in *EnviroDecisions*, 3 in *Gambit*, 3 in *Critter Care*, 2 in *Decisions*, 2 in *Floral and Faunal Notes*, and 1 in *EnviroBriefs*. *EnviroDecisions*, *EnviroInfoSheet*, and *Envirobriefs* were not listed in WorldCat or Ulrich's International Periodical Directory. WorldCat is a database of 32 million records that lists periodicals at 18,000 libraries. These journals were not listed at Loyola University library or any other Louisiana library. *Gambit* is a New Orleans weekly of events and activities. Two publications were published by the New Orleans Marketing Corporation. In contrast, Thomas's publications in the area of herpetology are extensive (30 articles in such journals as *Journal of Herpetology* and *Copia*).

All of Thomas's publications in the *EnviroInfoSheet*, *EnviroDecisions*, and *EnviroBriefs* are one- to two-page articles. The longest article is three pages in *EnviroInfoSheet*, entitled "The Nutria, Louisiana's Next Delicacy!" The other titles in the *Enviro* journals include, "The Homeowner's Guide to Integrated Pest Management," "Washable vs. Disposable Diapers," "Of Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls and Jobs," "Paper or Plastic: What's the Best Choice?" and "Wise Use: Unraveling the New Twist to a Veered [*sic*] Concept."

Thomas's qualifications as an expert in herpetology, the study of reptiles and amphibians, hardly constitute adequate credentials as an environmental communication chair. His publications in obscure environmental journals and his publications in the New Orleans Tourism Marketing Corporation are of strategic importance. These publications are characteristic of the antienvironmental movement that attempts to greenwash and create public relations campaigns to divert attention away from the ecological devastation of corporate policies by creating a so-called green facade (Deal, 1993, p. 6). A review of Thomas's credentials indicates that the environmental communication chair will fulfill Freeport's stated goal to "service the needs of private industry" (Martinez, 1995, p. 12A).

CONCLUSION

There are a number of lessons to be learned from the Loyola-Freeport case. Corporate funding comes with strings attached. Corporate power has been reclaimed by corporate investments in universities. As the power of corporations has increased economically and politically, this power has been expanded to universities.

The Freeport investment in Loyola University demonstrates how the balance of power shifts with corporate funding of universities. As a powerful transnational corporation, Freeport constrained the internal operation of Loyola. The social justice goal of the university was undermined. When faculty members and students challenged the contradictions between the social justice goal and the financial tie with Freeport, the corporation was able to exert pressure on the administration to stifle any discussion or protest of the environmental communication chair. When Loyola administration officials guaranteed the political climate of the university would be Freeport friendly, the funds for the endowment were returned.

The public relations function of a social justice university provides an excellent financial return. When Freeport's environmental and human rights record was criticized, all funded members of Freeport's Environmental Research Consortium, including Loyola University, defended Freeport's policies. When faculty members and students attempted to openly discuss the goal of the environmental communication chair, the debate was cut off and the administration members filled the position with a person having extensive ties to Freeport and antienvironmental organizations.

The Loyola-Freeport case illustrates that corporate funding imposes a strong structural constraint on universities. In a system that rewards the bottom line, the carrot is funding. In return, universities provide the experts for the research and public relations that reinforce the theories of economic freedom. Human rights and environmental protection are external to the logic of the market. The stick is the threat that funding will be terminated if faculty members and students actually practice the Loyola social justice goal.

External funding provides a structural constraint for the internal operation of a university. The power of Freeport to control the purse strings allows for a safe investment in return for extensive public relations rewards. When the political climate at Loyola was unstable, Freeport exerted pressure on administration officials by controlling the purse strings.

The logic of a transnational corporation, as the economic unit of capitalism, is to find the most profitable human and natural resources, to concentrate wealth in the hands of a few, to achieve the highest profit levels with the fewest workers and then turn basic necessities into commodities that are sold on the market. The repressive conditions under which resources are extracted and labor is exploited or

excluded are the fundamental social relations of the profit calculus. Freeport-Suharto-Kissinger are mere instrumental actors in the system of global capitalism. These social relations may be obscured by the mask of social justice.

NOTES

1. Glasberg's (1989) analysis is based on bank control theory. She argues that internal corporate policies are constrained by the collective power of large lending consortia that control the direction of funds.

2. The Carter administration increased commercial arm sales of \$112 million (a 2,000% increase between 1977 and 1978). U.S. arm sales peaked during the Reagan administration to \$1 billion between 1982 and 1984. Since the 1975 invasion, more than 2,600 Indonesian military officers have received military training in the United States under the International Military Education and Training program. Following the 1991 Deli massacre, when Indonesian troops wielding U.S.-made weapons killed more than 250 protesters in East Timor, Congress cut off military aid to Indonesia. Currently, the Indonesian military received E-IMET (nonmilitary training for military personnel) at U.S. taxpayer expense. The Clinton administration has asked for \$600,000 in IMET funding for 1998. New weapons sales include the F-16 fighter planes (Jardine, 1995, p. 35).

3. Thomas Egan, senior vice president of Freeport, indicated that the OPIC insurance is not "financially significant" because the company has \$50 million political risk insurance with a World Bank affiliate and other "private insurers for undisclosed amounts" ("Gold Rush in New Guinea," 1995, p. 68).

4. Freeport "closely collaborates with the Indonesian authorities and the military" in the forced relocation programs. In 1978 to 1979, Freeport joined with in the BANPRESS (Presidential Aid) Program to resettle the Amungme people in the new village Kampung Harapan Timika, and in 1984 the company donated \$200,000 to an "integrated resettlement program by the Military Commander and the regional government" ("Freeport's Attack on the Futures," 1992, p. 16).

5. This information is based on Thomas's resume.

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